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I. INTRODUCTION
The government’s concern over paid actors who push private agendas dates
back to at least 1843.1 In Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania cautioned of the dangers of allowing a practice that “may lead to
secret, improper and corrupt tampering with legislative action.”2 The
apprehension towards lobbyists continues today, with many Americans viewing

1. Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, 5 Watts & Serg. 315, 320 (Pa. 1843).
2. Id.
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lobbyists as unethical, dishonest, and wielding too much power. This view is
somewhat short-sighted and ignores that lobbyists are responsible for a lot of
good.4 In large numbers, lobbyists can help legislators and agencies by reducing
5
ambiguity in policy choices. Through lobbyists, legislators have access to a large
polling sample regarding where they should align ideologically based on who is
lobbying about an issue, and how large the group is.6 Regardless of how the
general public views lobbyists, they are entrenched in both the state and federal
governments.7 Lobbyist behavior is widely regulated as a response to wariness of
their prevalence and power.8
In 2014, California spent eleven billion dollars on state government
procurement contracts.9 Government procurement is the means through which
California purchases the services and goods it requires.10 A government
procurement contract is an agreement between the state entity that has purchased
11
the good or service, and the provider of the good or service. These contracts can
cover a wide variety of items, from traffic cones, waffle mix, and anti-virus
software, to helicopters, iPads, law enforcement vehicles, and loaded
ammunition.12 However, under current law, a prospective contractor can pay an
3. See Art Swift, Honesty and Ethics Rating of Clergy Slides to New Low, GALLUP (Dec. 16, 2013), http://
www.gallup.com/poll/166298/honesty-ethics-rating-clergy-slides-new-low.aspx?utm_source=honesty_and_
ethics_list&utm_medium=search&utm_campaign=tiles (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
(only six percent of Americans polled believe that lobbyists have high or very high honesty and ethical
standards); see also Lydia Saad, Americans Decry Power of Lobbyists, Corporations, Banks, Feds, GALLUP
(Apr. 11, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/147026/Americans-Decry-Power-Lobbyists-Corporations-BanksFeds.aspx?utm_source=too_much_power&utm_medium=search&utm_campaign=tiles (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (showing seventy-one percent of Americans polled believe that lobbyists
have too much power).
4. DONALD E. DEKIEFFER, THE CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO LOBBYING CONGRESS 5 (2007); see Newsweek
Staff, Good Lobbying vs. Bad Lobbying, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 17, 2009), http://www.newsweek.com/goodlobbying-vs-bad-lobbying-77199 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (describing a
lobbyist’s work for the Human Rights Watch advocating for victims of oppression).
5. David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, A Theory of Strategic Oversight: Congress, Lobbyists, and the
Bureaucracy, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 227, 228 (1995).
6. Id.
7. Lee Drutman, How Corporate Lobbyists Conquered American Democracy, ATL. (Apr. 20, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/04/how-corporate-lobbyists-conquered-american-demo
cracy/390822/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
8. See Inst. of Gov’t Advocates v. Fair Political Practices Comm’n, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1190 (E.D.
Cal. 2001) (holding that lobbyist reform is a result of strong policy concerns regarding accountability and
transparency).
9. Video: Lobbying Transparency Would Protect Taxpayers Funds, at 00:54–55, CAL. ASSEMB.
DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS (June 15, 2015), available at http://asmdc.org/news-room/video-gallery/lobbyingtransparency-would-protect-taxpayer-funds (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) [hereinafter
Lobbying Transparency Would Protect Taxpayers Funds].
10. Our Key Services, DEP’T OF GEN. SERVS., http://www.dgs.ca.gov/pd/Home.aspx (last visited Sept. 27,
2015) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
11. Id.
12. See State Contracts Index Listing, DEP’T OF GEN. SERVS., PROCUREMENT DIV., http://www.
documents.dgs.ca.gov/pd/contracts/contractindexlisting.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2015) (on file with The
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individual to influence a government official regarding a procurement contract
without the individual registering as a lobbyist.13 AB 1200 would have created
more transparency by requiring these individuals to register as lobbyists.14
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Section A gives the background of the Political Reform Act of 1974 (PRA),
and how AB 1200 attempted to amend it.15 Section B discusses why three
McGeorge students pushed for the creation of the bill.16 Section C explains how
17
the PRA regulates lobbyists. Section D addresses previous attempts to alter the
PRA and their results.18 Finally, Section E discusses the constitutionality of
regulating lobbyists.19
A. The Political Reform Act of 1974
20

California passed the PRA as Proposition 9 in 1974. Jerry Brown,
California’s Governor, helped write and campaign for the PRA while he was
21
California's Secretary of State and a candidate for Governor. The Act’s goal is
22
to create a more transparent and responsible state government. The PRA covers
a wide range of political reforms, including regulation of campaigns, elections,
23
ethical practices, and the behavior of public officials and lobbyists. The PRA
also created the Fair Political Practices Commission, which has the power to

University of the Pacific Law Review) (listing current Leveraged Procurement Agreements); see also State
Contract & Procurement Registration System (SCPRS) Data, DEP’T OF GEN. SERVS., http://www.dgs.
ca.gov/pd/Programs/eprocure/SCPRSData.aspx (last visited Sept. 25, 2015) (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review) (disclosing the subject of state procurement contracts and the amount of money the state
spent).
13. California Lobbying Disclosure, BOLDER ADVOCACY (Feb. 28, 2014), http://bolderadvocacy.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/02/california.lobbying.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
[hereinafter California Lobbying Disclosure].
14. Melanie Mason, Law Students Propose Bill to Close Lucrative Capitol Lobbying Loophole, L.A.
TIMES (June 2, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/politics/la-me-pol-lobbying-20150603-story.html (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
15. Infra Part II.A.
16. Infra Part II.B.
17. Infra Part II.C.
18. Infra Part II.D.
19. Infra Part II.E.
20. About the Political Reform Act, CAL. FAIR POLITICAL PRACTICES COMM’N, http://www.fppc.ca.gov/
index.php?id=221 (last visited July 20, 2015) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
[hereinafter About the Political Reform Act].
21. Robert Cruickshank, Who Was Jerry Brown, CALIFORNIA NORTHERN: A NEW REGIONALISM (2012),
available at http://calnorthern.net/who-was-jerry-brown/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
22. About the Political Reform Act, supra note 20.
23. Id.
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implement and enforce these reforms, as well as the ability to create new
regulations, as needed, in line with the PRA’s goals.24
B. Three McGeorge Law Students, Their Professor, and a Democratic Assembly
Member Walk into a Bar
While working as law clerks for the Fair Political Practices Commission, two
McGeorge School of Law students, Robert Nash and Robert Binning, discovered
behavior that seemed like lobbying in regards to procurement contracts was not
25
actually considered lobbying under the PRA. Nash and Binning began
researching the topic and talking with lobbyists and other capitol community
members, because they felt there was a “much closer connection between the
lobbying activity and the benefits received” in procurement contracts.26 Nash and
Binning found that the federal government and twenty-five out of fifty state
legislatures had already created some kind of labeling and disclosure requirement
27
for lobbying activities related to procurement contracts.
Fellow McGeorge student Alexander Khan joined Nash and Binning, and
with the help of Gary Winuk, former Fair Political Practices Commission
enforcement chief, and through their participation in the McGeorge Legislative
and Public Policy Clinic, the three students were able to develop their research.28
Eventually, the group sought Assembly Member Richard Gordon’s support, as he
is a respected reformer and sits on the Assembly Committee on Elections and
Redistricting―
the committee the bill would have to pass through.29 Nash, Binning,
and Khan continued to stay involved with their bill as it made its way through the
30
legislature, even as they studied for the July 2015 bar exam.
C. Lobbyists and the PRA
The PRA requires an individual to register with the Secretary of State as a
lobbyist if his or her principal employee obligations include communicating,
whether directly or through another party, with any elected state, agency, or
legislative official “for the purpose of influencing legislative or administrative
action.”31 Registration requires lobbyists and lobbyist employers to pay a nominal

24. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 83100–83112 (West 2015).
25. E-mail from Robert Binning, former McGeorge student, to Charles Wiseman, author (Aug. 11, 2015,
1:16 PM) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 82039 (West 2015).
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32

fee of $100 for both years of the legislative session. Lobbyist registration also
places restrictions on the amount of money lobbyists can expend on gifts, travel,
and entertainment for public officials.33 Lobbyists and lobbying firms are
prohibited from entering into contingency arrangements based upon “the defeat,
enactment, or outcome of any proposed legislative or administrative action.”34
Additionally, registration prohibits former officials from influencing state
35
government administrative actions for a one-year period. Currently, the PRA
defines administrative action as “[t]he proposal, drafting, development,
consideration, amendment, enactment, or defeat by any state agency rule,
regulation, or other action in any ratemaking proceeding or any quasi-legislative
proceeding.”36 However, this definition does not include any reference to stategranted government procurement contracts.37 This allows individuals to lobby the
legislature for procurement contracts without being labeled as lobbyists.38
D. Changing the PRA
The California legislature has made many attempts to reform the PRA with
39
mixed success. Surprisingly, one of the biggest obstacles to amending the PRA
40
comes from its coauthor and one of its proponents, Governor Jerry Brown.
During the 2013–2014 legislative session, Governor Brown vetoed SB 831, SB
41
1442, and SB 1443. These bills would have amended the PRA in line with its
42
goals of transparency and accountability. Had it not been vetoed, SB 831 would
have “changed campaign finance rules regarding gifts and travel, behested

32. California Lobbying Disclosure, supra note 13, at 6.
33. Id. at 10–11.
34. GOV’T § 86205(f) (prohibiting contingency fees for lobbyists and lobbyist employers).
35. California Lobbying Disclosure, supra note 13, at 11.
36. GOV’T § 82002(a)(1).
37. See Delegated Purchasing Authority, DEP’T OF GEN. SERVS. (June 26, 2015), http://www.dgs.ca.gov/
pd/Programs/Delegated.aspx (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review) (making no reference to state-granted government procurement contracts).
38. Mason, supra note 14.
39. See generally AB 12, 2001 Leg., 2001–2002 Sess. (Cal. 2001); AB 707, 2005 Leg., 2005–2006 Sess.
(Cal. 2005) (an act to amend the PRA that the legislature did not pass); Elizabeth Kim, The CAPS Act: Enacting
New Barriers Between Elected Officials and Interest Groups, 46 MCGEORGE L. REV. 355 (2014) (detailing
three reform bills passed by the legislature, two of which were vetoed); Ryan Matthews, SB 831: Bringing
Political Reform into the Twenty First Century, 46 MCGEORGE L. REV. 368 (2014) (explaining the failure of SB
831); Patrick Ford, Chapter 16: Combating Dark Money in California Politics, 46 MCGEORGE L. REV. 335
(2014) (highlighting legislation designed to sprinkle sunshine on dark money).
40. Robert M. Stern, What Happened to Jerry Brown, The Reformer We Once Knew?, S.F. CHRONICLE
(Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/openforum/article/What-happened-to-Jerry-Brown-the-reformerwe-581 0178.php (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
41. Kim, supra note 39, at 358; Matthews, supra note 39, at 384.
42. See Kim, supra note 39, at 360 (quoting the praise of Robert Stern, coauthor of the PRA, for the
CAPS act); Matthews, supra note 39, at 376 (stating SB 831’s goal was to prevent undue influence by special
interests).
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donations to nonprofit organizations, and expenditures of campaign funds.” SB
1442 and SB 1443 comprised two-thirds of a larger bill package that would have
made up the California Accountability in Public Service (CAPS) Act.44 Had the
three bills been enacted, the package would have “barred lobbyists from paying
for public officials’ fundraising events, increased the frequency of committee
reporting, expanded online reporting and disclosure, an prohibited lobbyists from
45
giving public officials gifts.” Although Governor Brown only signed one bill
from the package into law, the legislature was still able to expand the PRA by
changing the definition of “contribution” to include lobbyists hosting fundraising
46
events in their home or office.
The legislature has previously attempted to amend the PRA to include
influencing procurement contracts as behavior requiring registration as a
lobbyist.47 The first was AB 13 from the 2001–2002 session.48 If enacted, AB 13
would have had a similar effect as AB 1200: it would have expanded the
49
definition of “administrative action” to include procurement contracts. Although
the Assembly passed the bill 76–0, neither the Senate, nor any Senate committee
ever voted on it.50 AB 707, from the 2005–2006 session, began as a bill that
would require every “contractor, agent of a contractor, or consultant acting on
behalf of a contractor” to publically disclose “any communication the contractor,
agent, or consultant had with the state agency during the one‑year period
preceding the award of the contract” within thirty days of signing a contract with
51
a state agency. However, AB 707 was gutted and amended into a bill about
vote-by-mail ballots.52 All language regarding procurement contracts was struck
53
from the bill.
43. Matthews, supra note 39, at 374.
44. Kim, supra note 39, at 360.
45. Id., at 359.
46. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 82015(f)(2), (3) (West 2015).
47. See generally AB 13, 2001 Leg., 2001–2002 Sess. (Cal. 2001) (an act to amend the PRA, which was
not passed by the legislature); AB 707, 2005 Leg., 2005-2006 Sess. (Cal. 2005) (an act to amend the PRA,
which was not passed by the legislature).
48. AB 13, 2001 Leg., 2001–2002 Sess. (Cal. 2001).
49. Id.
50. Assembly Floor Vote of AB 13, Unofficial Ballot (Jan. 29, 2002), https://leginfo.legislature.
ca.gov/faces/billVotesClient.xhtml?billid=200120020AB13 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review); Assembly Appropriations Committee Vote of AB 13, Unofficial Ballot (Jan. 24, 2002), https://leginfo.
legislature.ca.gov/faces/billVotesClient.xhtml?billid=200120020AB13 (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review); Assembly Environmental Safety & Toxic Materials Committee, Unofficial Ballot (Jan.
15, 2002) https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billVotesClient.xhtml?billid=200120020AB13 (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review).
51. AB 707, 2005 Leg., 2005–2006 Sess. (Cal. 2005).
52. Id. When a bill is gutted and amended, the author “remove[s] the current contents in their entirety and
replace[s] them with different provisions.” CAL. ST. LEG., GLOSSARY OF LEGISLATIVE TERMS (last visited July
10, 2014), available at http://www.legislature.ca.gov/quicklinks/glossary.html#G (on file with The University of
Law Review).
53. AB 707, 2005 Leg., 2005-2006 Sess. (Cal. 2005).
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E. The Basis of State Power to Regulate Lobbyists
Whenever a legislative body, whether federal or state, imposes restrictions on
lobbyists, it activates concern over whether those restrictions infringe upon the
54
lobbyist’s constitutional rights. Lobbyist regulations trigger discussions
regarding the rights of freedom of speech, freedom of association, and the
freedom of associational privacy under the First Amendment, as well as
55
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection issues. When a matter is brought to
trial, the court balances the Lobbyist’s First Amendment rights and the legitimate
public interest in curbing special interests’ influence on government affairs.56
1. Challenges to Lobbyist Campaign Contribution Restrictions
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that contributing to election
campaigns is a type of First Amendment protected speech.57 Thus, courts
58
scrutinize any legislation that limits this right. Currently, in California, lobbyists
are barred from making political contributions to officials and candidates they are
registered to lobby.59 Courts have upheld this provision as constitutional because
it is sufficiently narrow in that it “does not prohibit contributions by all lobbyists
60
to all candidates.” Instead, the restriction “only prohibits contributions by
lobbyists . . . to those persons the lobbyist will be paid to lobby.”61 Courts have
balanced the narrow limitation with the potential for corruption and undue
62
influence. Courts have found that the public has an interest in not allowing a
lobbyist to be able to influence the government official through financial means.63

54. Steve A. Browne, The Constitutionality of Lobbyist Reform: Implicating Associational Privacy and
the Right to Petition the Government, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 717, 717 (1995).
55. Id. at 737.
56. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F. 3d 705, 716 (4th Cir. 1999).
57. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20 (1976); McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 120
(2003), overruled on other grounds by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010);
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010).
58. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 134–35.
59. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 85702 (West 2015). The statute states:
An elected state officer or candidate for elected state office may not accept a
contribution from a lobbyist, and a lobbyist may not make a contribution to an elected
state officer or candidate for elected state office, if that lobbyist is registered to lobby
the governmental agency for which the candidate is seeking election or the
governmental agency of the elected state officer.
Id.
60. Inst. of Gov’t Advocates v. Fair Political Practices Comm’n, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1190 (E.D. Cal.
2001).
61. Id.
62. Id.; N.C. Right to Life, Inc., 168 F.3d at 716.
63. See N.C. Right to Life, Inc., 168 F.3d at 716 (holding that the state has an interest in preventing
“actual corruption and the appearance of corruption” that may arise from lobbyist’s campaign contributions).
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Lobbyists have also suggested that regulating their contributions to officials
is unconstitutional because it completely bans, rather than just limits, such
contributions.64 Courts have rejected this argument based on the Nixon test that a
ban is only invalid if the resulting participation is “so low as to impede the ability
of candidates to amass the resources necessary for effective advocacy.”65 Courts
have reasoned that a lack of financial assistance from lobbyists will not overly
66
impair elected officials’ ability to raise contributions and run for office.
Additionally, an argument lobbyists have brought to combat restrictions is
that restrictions on lobbyists violate the equal protection clause under the
67
Fourteenth Amendment. Proponents of this theory argue that restricting
interactions between lobbyists and politicians is discriminatory.68 The argument
basis is that non-lobbyist individuals have no such restrictions placed upon them
and therefore lobbyists are placed into a separate class of individuals who have
69
had their rights unnecessarily and unfairly restricted.
70
To address this concern, courts have applied the “rational relationship” test.
The “rational relationship” test requires the fact-finder to answer two questions:
first, the court must identify “the goals or ends sought to be achieved or furthered
by the statute;” second, whether the classification “rests upon some reasonable
71
ground of differentiation which fairly relates to the object of the regulation.” As
to the first question, the court has examined the strong public policy of
prophylactically reducing the risk of corruption and undue influence in the
72
government. On the second question, the courts look to the fact that lobbyists
are a different class of individuals73—that lobbyists are paid to influence
74
legislative or administrative action is the basis for their separate classification.
As a result, lobbyists are afforded access to government officials in a manner
75
which others are not. Because of this close interaction, a higher level of concern
for corruption exists than the average person’s interaction with a government
official.76 In conclusion, the restrictions on lobbyists are appropriate because the

64. Inst. of Gov’t Advocates, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1190; N.C. Right to Life, Inc., 168 F.3d at 716.
65. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 397 (2000); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976);
Inst. of Government Advocates, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1190.
66. Inst. of Gov’t Advocates, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1190.
67. Id. at 1195.
68. Id. at 1194.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1191.
73. Id. at 1195.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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disparate treatment is rationally related to the goal of reducing corruption and
undue influence in the government.77
2. Contingency Fee Bans and the Constitution
The Supreme Court has not firmly established where in the Constitution the
78
right to lobby exists. However, many scholars believe that the right exists in the
First Amendment right to petition.79 Lobbying can be an immensely expensive
political endeavor.80 Scholars have offered contingency fees as a means to create
81
easier access to the lobbying process. The argument is premised on the rationale
that a contingency fee would allow a party to seek the assistance of a lobbyist
without facing high entry costs.82 Proponents argue that without the ability to
utilize contingency fees, some groups or individuals are unable to afford
lobbying services, and are therefore prohibited from exercising their First
83
Amendment right to petition the government. As a result, these scholars argue
that courts should strike down prohibitions of lobbyist contingency fee
arrangements as unconstitutional.84
Courts disagree and have consistently upheld the constitutionality of
85
prohibitions on lobbyist contingency fee arrangements. These courts reason that
narrow abridgement of one’s constitutional rights is allowed if there are
86
legitimate public policy concerns and the abridgement is necessary. The
relevant public policy concern is that the government should not enforce
contracts that may be used for improper means, even if that is not the contracts’
87
primary purpose.
III. AB 1200
AB 1200 sought to amend the Political Reform Act of 1974, expanding the
definition of “administrative action” to include state government procurement

77. Id.
78. Stacie L. Fatka & Jason Miles Levien, Protecting the Right to Petition: Why a Lobbying Contingency
Fee Prohibition Violates the Constitution, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 559, 581 (1998).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Fla. League of Prof’l Lobbyists, Inc. v. Meggs, 87 F.3d 457, 462 (11th Cir. 1996); see Associated
Industries of Kentucky v. Commonwealth, 912 S.W.2d 947 (Ky. 1995) (holding that contingency fee
arrangements are against public policy and therefore void, and that prohibiting them is constitutional).
86. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 42 (1976).
87. Providence Tools Co. v. Norris, 69 U.S. 45, 55 (1864).
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contracts. AB 1200 would have required a person to register as a “lobbyist” if he
or she communicated with a state government official to influence a state
government procurement contract that exceeded $250,000.89 Behaviors requiring
registration as a “lobbyist” with respect to the government procurement contract
would have included preparing the terms or bid documents of the contract, and
soliciting, approving, or rejecting the procurement contract.90
AB 1200’s expanded definition would not have included activities such as
submitting a bid or testifying at a public hearing about the state government
procurement contract.91 AB 1200 also would have carved out an exception for
92
placement agents employed by the prospective contractor.
IV. ANALYSIS
Section A discusses how AB 1200 would have financially affected lobbyists,
lobbyist employers, and lobbying firms and how they carry out their procurement
93
operations. Section B explores the impact AB 1200 would have had on
increasing transparency in government.94 Section C examines the constitutionality
95
of AB 1200. Section D looks at the future of AB 1200 and government
96
procurement contract reform.
A. AB 1200’s Impact on New and Existing Lobbyists
Registration as a lobbyist requires the individual to pay a $100 fee.97 A
lobbyist employer must pay a $100 fee, as well as an additional $100 for each
98
lobbyist employee. This registration lasts for the entirety of the legislative
99
session. The rules for renewal are similar for both lobbyists and lobbyist
employers: both must re-register before the end of the next legislative session, or
within ten days of meeting the “time spent” threshold of a subsequent legislative
100
session. Thus, the registration cost for a lobbyist employer would be at least
$200; that figure increases with each additional lobbyist employee.101 For a large
88. AB 1200, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Infra IV.A.
94. Infra IV.B.
95. Infra IV.C.
96. Infra IV.D.
97. California Lobbying Disclosure, supra note 13, at 6.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 86100; 86106–86107 (West 2015).
101. Id. § 86102.

543

2016 / Government
firm—such as Capitol Advocacy, LLC, which works with major corporations
including American Airlines, 7-11, and Fox Entertainment, and advertises its
experience with procurement contracts— the additional registration of employees
102
who deal with procurement contracts may not have a large impact. However,
some fear the registration requirement may harm smaller or minority lobbying
firms, because it would be harder for smaller firms to cover these costs.103
Democratic California Assembly Member, Sebastian Ridley-Thomas from Los
Angeles, stated this fear as his reason for voting against the bill while it was in
the Assembly Elections and Redistricting Committee.104
Higher costs go against AB 1200’s stated intention of creating an equal
playing field between big and small lobbyist employers.105 However, AB 1200
would have ensured that all individuals involved in influencing procurement
contracts over $250,000 adhered to PRA restrictions by requiring them to register
106
as lobbyists or lobbyist employers. These restrictions included limiting the
amount of money lobbyists can spend on gifts, travel, and entertainment, and
would have prevented former officials from influencing government procurement
contracts for a period of a year.107 These limitations could have helped smaller or
minority lobbying employers by ensuring that it would cost less to get a state
108
official’s attention. Alternatively, AB 1200 may have had a negative impact on
larger lobbyist employers or firms for similar reasons: firms like Capitol
Advocacy, LLC or KP Public Affairs that advertise their familiarity with the
procurement process would need to change their way of offering procurement
services if they did not meet the PRA’s new standards under AB 1200.109
B. AB 1200’s Impact on Transparency in Government
One primary motivation behind AB 1200 was to create more transparency in
the lobbying process specifically as it relates to procurement contracts.110 By
requiring individuals who influence government procurement contracts over

102. Procurement, CAPITOL ADVOCATES, LLC, http://www.capitoladvocacy.com/services-solutions/
procurement/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) [hereinafter
Procurement]; Lobbying Activity, CAL-ACCESS, http://cal-access.sos.ca.gov/Lobbying/Firms/Detail.aspx?id=
1147785&session=2015 (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
103. Mason, supra note 14.
104. See id. (noting that Assembly Member Ridley-Thomas did vote to pass the bill and send it to the
Senate).
105. Lobbying Transparency Would Protect Taxpayers Funds, supra note 9.
106. California Lobbying Disclosure, supra note 13, at 3.
107. Id. at 10–11.
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Pacific Law Review).
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$25,000 to register as lobbyists, AB 1200 attempted to shed some light onto the
procurement process.111 The PRA requires registered lobbyists, lobbyist
employers, and lobbying firms to disclose all related expenses—such as gifts,
travel, contributions, and fees—that benefit a state official, state agency and
legislative officials, candidates, or any immediate family of those in the
categories listed above.112 In addition, AB 1200 would have provided the public
113
with detailed information regarding who is influencing which bids.
AB 1200 may not have provided Californians with the level of transparency
that the authors expected, as those looking to influence procurement contracts
114
may utilize existing loopholes in the disclosure requirements of the PRA. State
law allows lobbyists to disclose money spent under the category of “other
payments to influence.”115 While lobbyists, lobbyist employers, and lobbying
firms still must report the amount of money spent, they do not have to report
116
what that money was spent on. For example, consultants who assist clients to
understand California’s governmental structure and process, but do not operate in
a way that would require them to register as lobbyists, are able to escape
disclosure requirements.117 This loophole may mean that firms who help clients
navigate the complexities of California procurement law without interacting with
the agency or decision maker directly may be able to avoid having to register as a
lobbyist.118 As such, the consulting party avoids the stringent disclosure and
119
expense requirements. These firms often have former California legislators or
120
officials on staff, so many see these firms as having an unfair advantage. Firms
and individuals required to disclose a great deal of their lobbying activities must
compete with those that wield similar or greater influence but do not deal with
121
the same disclosure requirements under California law. Similar practices may
have occurred under AB 1200, thus nullifying one of the primary purposes of the
bill: transparency.122
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C. Constitutional Questions Regarding the Expansion of the PRA and
Procurement Contracts
As AB 1200 attempted to expand the definition of administrative action to
include procurement contracts, individuals, firms, and employers who were not
considered lobbyists would have had to register as such.123 With this new influx
of registered lobbyists, questions about lobbyist regulations and their
124
constitutionality may have resurfaced. The expansion of the activities requiring
lobbyist registration may have raised overbreadth concerns.125 To determine
whether this was true of AB 1200, the court would have looked at the restricted
group’s breadth and the strength of the policy considerations underlying the
restriction.126Although AB 1200 would have expanded who must register as a
lobbyist, the new label requirements still would have been sufficiently narrow
because it only prevented some lobbyists from contributing to some candidates.127
Additionally, the strong policy considerations to prevent government corruption
128
remained the same as the PRA’s previous lobbyist requirements. As a result,
the policy considerations behind AB 1200 would have likely outweighed
concerns over a lobbyist’s freedom of speech.129
AB 1200’s opponents may also argue that the bill infringes on their right to
130
commercial speech under the First Amendment. Courts define “commercial
speech” as “expression related to the economic interests of the speaker and its
audience, generally in the form of a commercial advertisement for the sale of
131
goods and services.” Procurement contracts deal with buying and selling
goods.132 Therefore, any speech an agent uses to influence a state government
official regarding a procurement contract would be considered commercial
speech.133 However, courts afford commercial speech less protection under the
134
First Amendment because there is potential for deception or confusion.
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Therefore, the government can limit commercial speech if a court finds that: (1)
the government’s interest is substantial; (2) the regulation advances the
government’s interest; and (3) the regulation is narrowly tailored to address the
135
government’s interest. AB 1200 would have survived this test because
preventing corruption in government is a substantial interest, creating more
transparency in lobbyist activity advances this goal, and AB 1200 is sufficiently
narrow because it would have only affected those influencing state government
officials regarding procurement contracts.136
Additionally, if lobbyists raised a Fourteenth Amendment challenge against
137
AB 1200, the court would employ the “rational relationship” test. This test has
two elements: first, the court must identify “the goals or ends sought to be
achieved or furthered by the statute;” second, the court must determine whether
the classification “rests upon some reasonable ground of differentiation which
138
fairly relates to the object of the regulation.” As courts are likely to uphold the
strong societal interest in keeping corruption out of government, and will likely
view lobbyists as a special class with the ability to influence government officials
in ways most citizens cannot, a rational relationship exists between the goals
underlying AB 1200 and the PRA, generally, to prevent corruption and undue
139
influence and the restrictions they place on lobbyists. Therefore, a Fourteenth
Amendment challenge to AB 1200 would have been unlikely to succeed.140
One particularly relevant concern is the prohibition of contingency fee
141
agreements and procurement contracts. Many individuals involved in the
procurement process rely on contingency fee arrangements to be paid.142 AB 1200
would require these individuals and groups to register as lobbyists even though
143
they are just selling goods. AB 1200 was amended to address this concern by
144
expressly exempting “placement agents” from having to register as lobbyists.
Consequently the amendment exempted employees of the prospective good or
service provider from needing to register as lobbyists.145 Instead, AB 1200 would
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have only required those outside contractors specifically hired to influence
government procurement actions to register.146
D. What is Next for AB 1200
AB 1200 was removed from the inactive file, and, as of this writing, is
147
awaiting concurrence in Senate amendments. In the meantime, Gary Winuk,
former Fair Political Practices Commission enforcement chief, submitted a ballot
measure with similar language to AB 1200 to the State of California.148 The ballot
measure has a wider aim than AB 1200, and seeks to reform many facets of
California’s state government.149 The measure would expand disclosure
requirements in the election process and in government decisions, as well as
promote government accountability and ethics.150 Additionally, the measure
targets individuals who leave public office in order to become a lobbyist or work
151
with lobbyist groups. The proposed changes to Section 82002 of the California
Government Code, regarding procurement contracts, are very similar to those
changes in AB 1200.152 This is also reflected in the language regarding
exemptions for bona fide salespeople—which was removed from AB 1200—and
153
placement agents. It is still too early to speculate how the ballot measure will
154
fare.
V. CONCLUSION
AB 1200 would have amended the PRA regarding lobbyist registration and
procurement contracts in a way that would not have been overly burdensome to
155
the individuals affected. The changes also would have allowed smaller
businesses and service providers to compete with larger industries.156 AB 1200
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would have continued the initial goals of the PRA by increasing transparency and
accountability in the California government.157 AB 1200 did not provoke any
substantial constitutional challenges.158 Furthermore, AB 1200 would have closed
159
a loophole in the PRA that the legislature had ignored and avoided.
Californians will have to wait to see if AB 1200 makes its way through the
legislature: only then will the public know if Governor Jerry Brown has returned
to his reformer roots.
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